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Contract farming is a sales arrangement between a farmer and a firm, agreed before production begins,
which provides the farmer with resources or services. Many governments and donors promote contract
farming as part of agricultural development policies. However, there is serious concern whether smaller
farmers can benefit from these arrangements.
This paper presents the results of a systematic review that analysed the evidence in the literature on
income effects for smallholders. The review included all studies with an econometric design to reduce
selection bias in effect estimates. The meta-analysis covered 26 empirical instances of contract farming
in 13 developing countries. The contracts varied widely, with varying service packages provided by the
firm to the farmers. Using truth table analysis, we explored combinations of services associated with rel-
atively high or relatively low income effects.
The meta-analysis resulted in an overall pooled average effect size of 38%. However, we show that there
are publication and survivor biases. Non-significant effects are systematically underreported. Moreover,
all studies assessed the effectiveness of the contractual arrangement when these had already survived the
start-up problems. Both sources of bias lead to an overestimation of the average income effect.
The findings point to the need for substantial income effects for contract farming arrangements to sur-
vive over time. Both firms and farmers face risks; for example, farmers may side-sell products after hav-
ing received the services from the firm. The most effective contractual arrangements included a price
premium, especially when there was no farmers’ organisation to broker the contract between the farmer
and the firm.
We show that smallholders can benefit from the contractual arrangement. However, the poorest farm-
ers are rarely included; we show that, in 61% of the cases, the contract farmers had significantly larger
landholdings or more assets than the average farmers in the region.
 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Contents1. Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2. Contract farming as a development intervention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482.1. Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2. Intended outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483. Review methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.1. Search and screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2. Evaluation of rigour. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3. Meta-analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4. Assessment of publication bias. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.5. Assessment of survivor bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.6. Beneficiary analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
G. Ton et al. /World Development 104 (2018) 46–64 473.7. Heterogeneity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4. Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504.1. Search and screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2. Evaluation of rigour. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504.2.1. Selection bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2.3. Selective reporting bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2.4. Spillover effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2.5. Other sources of bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544.3. Meta-analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.3.1. Pooled average effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.3.2. Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554.4. Assessment of publication bias. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.5. Assessment of survivor bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.6. Beneficiary analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.7. Heterogeneity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584.7.1. Moderator analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.7.2. Meta-regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.7.3. Qualitative comparative analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5. Discussion and implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Conflict of interest statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 621. Background
Contract farming is a commercial relationship between a firm
and a group of farmers. It is an agreement in which farm produc-
tion is bought in advance by a firm in exchange for certain services
such as pre-financing of inputs. Although principally a commercial
initiative, contract farming may be considered a tool for develop-
ment, as a way to help smallholder farmers overcome the chal-
lenges they face when trying to access more remunerative
markets. It helps farmers to connect to output markets and often
provides inputs, credit, or agricultural extension (Da Silva &
Rankin, 2013; Eaton & Shepherd, 2001; World Bank, 2007). These
services can be provided by private firms, but can also come from,
or be facilitated by, multi-actor partnerships between companies,
governments and NGOs (Prowse, 2012). Reliable estimates of the
incidence of contract farming in the agricultural sector in develop-
ing countries are scarce and unreliable (Minot & Ronchi, 2015; Oya,
2012). Nevertheless, the evidence that does exist suggests that a
rapidly growing number of firms – at least in modern market chan-
nels – are relying on contracts for the procurement of products
from preferred suppliers (Da Silva & Rankin, 2013; Reardon &
Berdegue, 2002). Modern market channels place higher demands
regarding value chain coordination and traceability than tradi-
tional markets. Contract farming is one of the institutional arrange-
ments that makes such a high degree of chain coordination
possible. It is an alternative to centralised governance systems
with complete control by the firm, such as plantation production,
and may be particularly attractive in countries where firms face
constraints to direct ownership of land.
Contract farming is considered by most authors to be a positive
development for agricultural innovation in developing countries
(Da Silva & Rankin, 2013; Eaton & Shepherd, 2001; Minot &
Ronchi, 2015; Otsuka, Nakano, & Takahashi, 2016; Schipmann &
Qaim, 2010). Moreover, input-providing contracts are believed to
be beneficial for poor farmers, who may lack the financial capacity
to acquire these inputs themselves, because they rarely have
access to credit (Key & Runsten, 1999; Minten, Randrianarison, &
Swinnen, 2009; Vorley & Proctor, 2008).
Yet, there is serious concern whether the smaller farmers really
benefit from these arrangements. In the earlier literature on con-
tract farming, the issue of power imbalances was especially promi-nent in the debate (Glover & Kusterer, 1990; Little & Watts, 1994),
and the discussion was rather polarised (Oya, 2012). Most of these
earlier studies compared the incomes of participating with non-
participating farmers, or compared incomes before and after the
contract was signed. Such direct comparisons of averages have a
high risk of suffering from selection bias or bias due to other con-
founding factors (e.g. the weather or world market prices), rather
than reflecting the results of the contract farming arrangement
itself. In the last decade, there has been a rapid increase in the
number of effectiveness studies on contract farming that use stron-
ger econometric research designs and provide more reliable esti-
mates of net effects. To distil generalised inferences from this
rapidly growing body of evidence, a systematic review is needed.
This review is more structured and formalised than earlier
reviews on the subject (Minot & Ronchi, 2015; Nguyen, Dzator, &
Nadolny, 2015; Otsuka et al., 2016; Prowse, 2012; Wang, Wang,
& Delgado, 2014). We followed the systematic review process for
meta-analysis as defined by the Campbell and Cochrane Collabora-
tion (Higgins & Green, 2011). However, we added two complemen-
tary synthesis methods. For each contract farming scheme, we
compared the differences in land and asset ownership between
the contracting farmers and the average farmers in the region. Fur-
thermore, we added a qualitative comparative analysis (Collier,
2014; Ragin, 2008) of the 28 empirical instances of contract farm-
ing covered by the meta-analysis to identify conditions that may
explain why some contract schemes showed relatively high
income effects. The protocol for the review has been peer-
reviewed and was published pre-analysis by the International Ini-
tiative for Impact Evaluation in December 2015 (Ton et al., 2015).
We show that contract farming needs to offer clear incentives to
farmers, especially when farmers can easily decide to exit the con-
tractual arrangement. Positive income effects are likely a precondi-
tion for farmers to give up part of their autonomy in marketing,
production and quality control. Farmers who enter into a contract
with a firm are rarely the poorest farmers in their region. We pre-
sent suggestive evidence that higher levels of embedded services
yield higher income effects. In contract farming arrangements with
relatively high income effects, a price premium was part of the
incentive structure, especially when farmer organisations were
not involved in the set-up of the contractual arrangement between
the firm and the farmer. The paper ends with a discussion of the
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inferences due to diversity and bias, and provides recommenda-
tions for future research on the topic.
2. Contract farming as a development intervention
2.1. Characteristics
Before turning to the literature overview, it is imperative to
understand the raison-d’être of contract farming. Contractual
arrangements in agriculture are extremely diverse and vary wildly
in embedded services, credit arrangements, payment systems and
price-setting mechanisms (FAO, 2008). There are widely different
types of contracts, going from full resource provisioning contracts
with detailed production and marketing conditions to mere verbal
agreements to buy whatever quantity is produced at the going
local market price. We use a more specific definition of contract
farming, adapted from Prowse (2012), which covers contracts in
which the farmer is provided with planting material, inputs or
credit:
Contract farming is a contractual arrangement for a fixed term
between a farmer and a firm, agreed verbally or in writing
before production begins, that provides material or financial
resources to the farmer and specifies one or more product or
process requirements, for agricultural production on land
owned or controlled by the farmer, which gives the firm legal
title to (most of) the crop or livestock.
Therefore, studies were excluded if they related to contractual
arrangements without service-providing clauses. This excluded
commercial contracts such as forward sales and price hedging,
which do not imply a contractual relation between a procuring
firm and supplying farmers. We also excluded contractual arrange-
ments only concerning marketing, such as collective marketing,
marketing boards, and preferred suppliers to supermarkets, except
when additional services were provided. Likewise, we did not
select studies that concerned certification only, such as UTZ Certi-
fied, Fair Trade, and Rainforest Alliance, unless a non–transferableFig. 1. Conceptualising contractual arrangemfixed-term forward sales contract with a specific firm was offered.
Moreover, we excluded studies on traditional sharecropping
arrangements in which a tenant farmer is provided with inputs
in exchange for an agreed share of the harvest. Hybrid situations,
such as when a contract between a cooperative and a fixed buyer
specified service-delivery of the cooperative to its members, have
been included when the decision to enter into the contract was
optional for individual members. Finally, we excluded contractual
arrangements outside the realm of ‘smallholder agriculture’, such
as timber exploitation and marine fishery.
Even with this restrictive definition, the diversity within the
studied contractual arrangements is striking. Fig. 1 depicts the
complex incentive structure faced by firms and farmers while
designing or negotiating the contract. The motivation of the farm-
ers to do so is different from the motivation of the buyer, and these
incentives will depend on and be influenced by the geographic,
socio-political and economic context. Each geographic setting pro-
vides a different institutional environment in which the exact pro-
visions of the contract are being defined.2.2. Intended outcomes
In this paper, we distinguish between immediate, intermediate,
and ultimate outcomes. The most obvious immediate outcomes of
contract farming arrangements are related to the existence and
duration of a contractual arrangement. The initial acceptance and
subsequent continuation of the contract is an indicator of the over-
all satisfaction of the firm and the farmers with the arrangement,
especially when the option for farmers to step out is real
(Wendimu, Henningsen, & Gibbon, 2016). Effects on smallholders
are likely to be larger for contract farming arrangements that are
in place for a longer time because investments in productive assets
and knowledge take time to bear fruit. Moreover, it is likely that
unsuccessful farmers will have left the arrangement in these initial
years. Research by Narayanan (2013) in India shows that farmers
move in and out of contracts quite regularly. In time, contractual
arrangements between firms and farmers may become a normalents as a result of a negotiation process.
G. Ton et al. /World Development 104 (2018) 46–64 49business option in a region, and part of the portfolio of options
available to farmers to market their produce.
The intermediate outcomes, which result from these immediate
outcomes, are directly related to the contracted product and
include improved crop management, improved yields, higher qual-
ity handling, and adoption of specific cultivars. These intermediate
outcomes vary widely between contractual arrangements and
hence are difficult to compare directly.
The indicators for the ultimate outcomes of contract farming
arrangements, i.e. the results of the intermediate outcomes, are
more harmonised between contract farming schemes. The ultimate
outcomes considered for this review were income and food secu-
rity. However, we concentrate in this paper on income effects, as
only one of the eligible studies measured food security outcomes
of contract farming (Bellemare & Novak, 2017). Another study,
which analysed food security effects of smallholder supply to
supermarkets (Andersson, Chege, Rao, & Qaim, 2015; Chege,
Andersson, & Qaim, 2015), did not comply with our definition of
contract farming, as no embedded services were offered to the
farmers.3. Review methods
3.1. Search and screening
After a pilot search in March 2015, a comprehensive electronic
search was applied to Scopus, CAB Abstracts, Econlit, Web of
Science, Tropag & Rural, and Agricola in October 2015. The main
terms used in the search to identify the pool of studies within
which we expected to find studies for the meta-analysis were:
‘contract farming’, ‘nucleus estate’, ‘cooperative’, ‘producer organi-
sation’, ‘pre-harvest agreement’, ‘value chain’, ‘farm-firm’, ‘out-
grower’, and ‘vertical integration’.
Snowballing the reference list in review articles and other
repositories of research (e.g. worldwidescience.org, FAO, World
Bank, Google Scholar) added more studies to the review. The
search results were uploaded in EPPI Reviewer 4 and screened
for relevance and the rigour of the methodology and analysis, in
order to combine these results in a meta-analysis of effectiveness.
Each of the papers was screened by at least two researchers. These
terms could be in the title or abstract. See the protocol for the exact
search strings used (Ton et al., 2015).3.2. Evaluation of rigour
During the screening, particular attention was paid to sources of
bias that could have affected the net-effect calculations, especially
selection bias. Contract farming is usually initiated by a private
company that locates its operations in an area where the product
it wants to buy is widely grown or where agro-ecological condi-
tions are well suited to growing the product of interest. It is com-
mon practice for the company to prefer those farmers which it
believes can offer the right quality at the right price. Large farms
in easy-to-reach locations are more likely to be selected. Farmers
who are offered a contract can decide whether or not to take it.
Those farmers who expect to benefit most from the contract are
more likely to accept the offer. Self-selection occurs because this
decision is at least partly based on unobservable characteristics
such as ability, dedication, or knowledge. A simple comparison of
income between contract and non-contract farmers will therefore
almost never retrieve the true causal impact of contract farming.
Several strategies to resolve this bias have been proposed in the
vast literature on impact evaluations (Heckman, Ichimura, &
Todd, 1998; Heckman, Urzua, & Vytlacil, 2006; Imbens &Wooldridge, 2009; Khandker, Koolwal, & Samad, 2009; Shadish,
Cook, & Campbell, 2002).
To assess the risk of bias of each study, we used the 3ie Risk of
Bias tool (Hombrados & Waddington, 2012), which was developed
to enable consistent assessment of the internal validity of social
experiments and quasi-experiments. Studies were assessed by
two researchers individually, and resulting disagreements were
discussed and resolved jointly. The 3ie Risk of Bias tool consists
of eight evaluation criteria, each focusing on different threats to
the validity of the net-effect estimate reported in each study. The
tool contains detailed descriptions of how to attribute a score to
each criterion specified per type of study design. Studies that rely
on cross-sectional data to identify the causal impact of contract
farming are more likely to be biased than Randomised Controlled
Trials (RCTs) or studies using panel data. With cross-sectional data,
there are various approaches to address the selection problem,
including Propensity Score Matching (PSM), Instrumental Vari-
ables (IV), Heckman models, and endogenous switching regression
models. We explain these methods in more detail in the results
section.3.3. Meta-analysis
In a meta-analysis, the sample size, effect size, and standard
errors of each study are used to compute a weighted average
net-effect. The quantitative information on the effectiveness of
contract farming was synthesised using inverse-variance weighted
statistical meta-analysis. Random effects rather than fixed effects
meta-analysis was used because the treatment (contract farming)
was not uniform and its effects were likely to be context-specific.
Random effect models assume that there is some true variation
between the included studies, besides the random variation within
each study due to sampling (Higgins & Green, 2011).
As outcome measure we used the Response Ratios (RRs). RRs
are defined as the ratio of the outcome in the treatment group to
the outcome in the control group. RRs have the advantage of being
easy to interpret; values above and below one indicate percentage
changes in the outcome of the treatment group over the compari-
son. Thus, an RR of 0.90 indicates a 10% average decrease in the
treatment group relative to the comparison, and an RR of 1.10 indi-
cates a 10% average increase. All outcomes were measured on a
continuous ratio scale with a natural zero point, which is a
required condition for the RR to be meaningful (Borenstein,
Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2011). To estimate the pooled aver-
age effect size, we used the Stata commands metan and metareg.
The results of the meta-analysis were checked for their sensitivity
to outliers, synthetic effects, research design, and way of measur-
ing income (Ton, Desiere, Vellema, Weituschat, & D’Haese, 2017).3.4. Assessment of publication bias
Scientific articles are more likely to be written and published if
they find a significant effect of the programme being evaluated
(Ioannidis, 2005; Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2007), which implies that
the academic literature is inherently biased towards studies that
find significant effects. The pooled average effect sizes that result
from the meta-analysis will inevitably overestimate the ‘true’
effect of contract farming on income. Studies that are not pub-
lished but could have shown insignificant effects could not be
included in the meta-analysis. The likely presence of publication
bias was formally assessed using funnel plots and Egger’s statisti-
cal test (Egger, Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997). A funnel plot
is a graph that shows the effect size (horizontal axis) against the
precision of the study (vertical axis). An asymmetric funnel plot
suggests publication bias.
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In addition to publication bias, we looked at survivor bias. The
results of the meta-analysis may overestimate the effectiveness
of contract farming when studies systematically neglect the empir-
ical instances of contract farming that failed in the first few years.
We analysed the time lag between the year of the impact evalua-
tion and the year that the contract farming arrangement started
to operate in the area.
3.6. Beneficiary analysis
The studies selected for meta-analysis use different methods to
find farmers with and without a contract that, otherwise, share
similar characteristics. This implies that the farmers used in the
net-effect computation are not necessarily a good representation
of the ‘average farmer’ in the same location. Fortunately, most
studies provide descriptive statistics (T-tests or Probit regressions)
to identify differences between farmers with and without a con-
tract, and assess whether contract farmers tend to be richer than
the average farmer in the research area, considering average
plot-size or the value of their assets.
3.7. Heterogeneity analysis
The most important sources of heterogeneity between empiri-
cal instances were expected to be due to the type of production,
region, and the service package embedded in the transaction (see
Fig. 1). Types of production were categorised as annual or peren-
nial crops or animal husbandry, and depending on their perishabil-
ity. Contracts were characterised according to the level of service
provisioning. The effect of these sources of heterogeneity on the
impact of contract farming in terms of income was tested with
bivariate Analyses of Variance (moderator analyses) and multi-
variate Ordinary Least Square regressions (meta-regressions).
In addition to these variable-based analyses, we used a case-
based truth table analysis, part of Qualitative Comparative Analysis
(QCA). The QCA method has been developed by the political scien-
tist Charles Ragin (1987, 2000, 2008). QCA is used to explore con-
figurations of factors within a small data set, looking at the
presence or absence of an outcome condition. The data set of
observations is a matrix, with the cases in rows and the conditions
in columns, similar to the data set used in statistical software. We
used the QCA software application Kirq 2.1.12 (Reichert &
Rubinson, 2014) to build the truth table. The truth table gives an
overview of all possible combinations of conditions (configura-
tions) that have a similar outcome (e.g. highly effective, less effec-
tive). QCA considers each row in the truth table (with a proper
threshold consistency score) as the bearer of a set of conditions
that is sufficient to generate the outcome. QCA infers causality
based on the logic of implication, i.e. the condition needs to be con-
sistently present or absent for the outcome to be realised; while
mainstream statistics use the logic of variation, i.e. the outcome
is realised when the variable is higher or lower (Thiem,
Baumgartner, & Bol, 2015). QCA is an exploratory technique and,
just like statistical correlations, needs additional evidence to con-
clude on causality of the detected data pattern.
As the analytical model for the QCA, we used the presence or
absence of four key incentives embedded in each of the contractual
arrangements: (1) the involvement of a farmer organisation at the
start; (2) the offer of higher-than-local prices (price-premium); (3)
the provision of credit; and (4) the provision of key inputs (seeds/
breeds, agrochemicals). Then, following the advice of Collier
(2014), we reflected on the truth table to find combinations of con-
ditions that proved consistently related with arrangements that
provided relatively high or relatively low income effects.4. Results
4.1. Search and screening
The electronic search retrieved 8,529 unique studies. After the
full-text screening, 195 studies were found to present research
on contract farming and 75 studies presented quantitative out-
comes on smallholder farmers. Of the 75 studies in the core set,
most did not meet the criteria for methodological and econometric
rigour, presented in the pre-analysis protocol for the review, and
had to be excluded from the meta-analysis. The meta-analysis of
income effects was based on data from 22 studies, covering 26
empirical instances of contract farming (Fig. 2). All these studies
reported on the ultimate outcomes with regard to income or food
security.
Although 22 included studies used income as the dependent
variable in the regression, the definition and proxy-indicators var-
ied between studies. Most studies reported crop income (41%),
farm income (23%) or household income (27%). Two studies (9%)
reported household expenditure. Only one study used food secu-
rity as an outcome variable. Only eight studies additionally
reported some intermediate outcomes. Most of these studies
reported more than one intermediate outcome, often part of a cau-
sal relation that leads to income effects (Table 1). No study explic-
itly reported immediate outcomes.
4.2. Evaluation of rigour
Twenty-two studies met the criteria for inclusion in the meta-
analysis of income effects, and had a design aspect to assess the
counterfactual situation of contract farmers, i.e. the situation of
these farmers in cases where not having a contract would have
been acceptable to them. No study applied an RCT, or a longitudi-
nal analysis with panel data. They all used cross-sectional surveys
and econometric methods to resolve selection bias. However, even
these methodologically strong studies still faced some challenges
when attempting to identify the impact of contract farming on
income. Using the 3ie-tool (Hombrados & Waddington, 2012), we
assessed the risk of bias in the income effect-estimate (Table 2).
The risk of bias analysis is detailed in the report provided as sup-
plementary material to this paper (Ton, Desiere, Vellema,
Weituschat, & D’Haese, 2017).
4.2.1. Selection bias
The criteria used in the assessment of the risk of selection bias
depended on the statistical method used to estimate the impact of
contract farming. Four different research designs were encoun-
tered: endogenous switching regression models (3 studies),
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) (7 studies), and Instrumental
Variables (IV)/Heckman (12 studies).
An elegant way to illustrate the differences between these dif-
ferent econometric research designs in deriving the net-effect esti-
mates of contract farming is the use of three equations:
y0i ¼ a0 þ b0Xi þ e0i
y1i ¼ a1 þ b1Xi þ e1i
Di ¼ 1ðcZi þ v i > 0Þ
ð1Þ
Farmer i can choose to operate under two different regimes: the
farmer can participate in contract farming (regime 1) or the farmer
can sell his/her produce in local markets (regime 0). With each
regime, the farmer obtains a different outcome (yi) which is a func-
tion of observable household characteristics (Xi) and unobservable
characteristics captured by the error term e. The choice between
the two regimes depends on observable and unobservable charac-
teristics of the farmer and the contract (Zi). The indicator function
Fig. 2. Sources of included studies.
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otherwise. This set of equations can be summarised by the follow-
ing switching regression:
yi ¼ a0 þ Diða1  a0Þ þ b0Xi þ Diðb1  b0ÞXi þ e0i þ Diðe1i
 e0iÞ ð2Þ
If the assumption of constant returns on inputs across regimes
holds, the switching regression Eq. (2) simplifies to:
yi ¼ a0 þ Diða1  a0Þ þ bXi þ Diðe1i  e0iÞ þ e0i ð3Þ
This equation neatly summarises the selection problem that
haunts causal identification of the impact of contract farming.
Since we cannot assume that farmers participate randomly in con-tract farming, the unobservable term Diðe1i  e0iÞ will be correlated
with the treatment. Hence, estimating this equation with an Ordi-
nary Least Squares regression (OLS), while omitting the term
Diðe1i  e0iÞ, will give biased estimates. In other words, selection
into contract farming is endogenous. For example, a highly skilled
farmer may be more likely to participate in contract farming and at
the same time always obtain higher yields than a less able farmer
even if he or she chose not participate in contract farming. In this
case, OLS overestimates the impact of contract farming since it
does not account for ‘farming ability’, which is unobserved by the
researcher.
4.2.2.1. Endogenous switching regression models. Endogenous
switching regression models assume that both regimes (producing
Table 1
Overview of the studies included in the meta-analysis of income effects.
Author Country Product Sample
size
Study design Outcomes1 Effect size
(RR)
95% CI)2
Awotide, Fashogbon, and Awoyemi (2015) Nigeria Rice 341 PSM Yield?
Crop income?
Poverty
1.55
1.71
0.83
[1.33–1.77]
[1.42–2.00]
[0.66–1.00]
Bellemare (2012) Madagascar Green beans, leek,
snow peas, rice,
barley
1178 IV Household income 1.55 [1.28–1.81]
Bellemare and Novak (2017) Madagascar Green beans, leek,
snow peas, rice,
barley
1178 IV Duration hungry
season
0.92 [0.84–1.00]
Bolwig, Gibbon, and Jones (2009) Uganda Coffee 160 Heckman Yield?
Practice adoption?
Crop income
1.30
1.53
1.92
[1.17–1.44]
[1.06–2.23]
[1.55–2.29]
Cahyadi and Waibel (2011) Indonesia Oil palm 245 Heckman Household income 1.24 [0.95–1.53]
Escobal and Cavero (2012) Peru Potato 360 Switching
regression
Crop income 1.76 [1.17–2.35]
Girma and Gardebroek (2015) Ethiopia Honey 195 IV Price?
Crop income
1.23
2.19
[1.20–1.25]
[1.66–2.72]
Ito, Bao, and Su (2012) China Watermelon 318 PSM Farming income 1.56 [1.22–1.90]
Jones and Gibbon (2011) Uganda Cocoa 222 IV Total output?
Price?
Crop income
1.25
1.08
1.52
[1.13–1.36]
[1.04–1.12]
[1.32–1.72]
Maertens and Swinnen (2009) Senegal French beans 217 PSM Household income 3.23 [1.41–5.05]
Miyata, Minot, and Hu (2009) China Apples, green
onions
162 Heckman Household income 1.27 [1.02–1.51]
Narayanan (2014) India Marigold
Papaya
Broiler chicken
Gherkins
262–289 Switching
regression
Crop income 0.52
1.43
17.6
1.27
[0.18–1.54]3
[0.59–3.45]3
[9.38–33.15]3
[0.15–10.9]3
Ramaswami, Birthal, and Joshi (2009) India Broiler chicken 50 IV Crop income 1.85 [0.85–2.84]
Rao and Qaim (2011) Kenya Various vegetables 402 Switching
regression
Household income 1.48 [1.11–1.85]
Saigenji (2012) Vietnam Tea 88, 90 PSM Technical efficiency?
Household expenditure
Not
possible1.04
[1.01–1.07]
Sethboonsarng, Leung, and Stefan (2008) Laos Rice 585 PSM Yield?
Price?
Crop income
1.26
1.18
1.80
[1.08–1.44]
[0.66–1.70]
[1.30–2.18]
Simmons, Winters, and Patrick (2005) Indonesia Seed rice 124 IV Farming income?
Household labour
0.94
1.10
[0.70–1.18]
[0.98–1.22]
Simmons et al. (2005) Indonesia Broiler chicken 200 IV Farming income?
Household labour
4.91
0.67
[2.67–7.15]
[0.27–1.70]3
Sokchea and Culas (2015) Cambodia Rice 75 Heckman Farming income 1.85 [1.03–2.67]
Trifkovic´ (2014) Vietnam Catfish 191 Heckman Household expenditure 1.29 [1.14–1.45]
Wainaina, Okello, and Nzuma (2014) Kenya Broiler chicken 180 PSM Crop income 1.31 [1.03–1.58]
Wang, Moustier, and Loc (2014) Vietnam Various vegetables 107 PSM Household income 1.37 [1.06–1.67]
Warning and Key (2002) Senegal Peanuts 26 Heckman Farming income 1.29 [1.00–1.58]
Winters, Simmons, and Patrick (2005) Indonesia Seed corn 300 Heckman Input use?
Labour use?
Farming income
2.13
1.15
2.83
[1.25–3.01]
[0.97–1.33]
[1.66–4.01]
1 Arrows reflect the causal logic as described in the study by the authors.
2 The CI reported here differ from the CI reported in the meta-analysis (forest plots) because the CI is this table are symmetric around the RR, while the CI used in the meta-
analysis are symmetric around ln(RR). The CI reported here equal ½RR  1:96 seðRRÞ, while the CI reported in the meta-analysis equal ½expðlnðRRÞ  1:96 seðRRÞÞ.
3 CI interval calculated using ½expðlnðRRÞ  1:96 seðRRÞÞ. Using ½RR  1:96 seðRRÞ would produce a CI that includes negative values for the RR.
52 G. Ton et al. /World Development 104 (2018) 46–64for the spot market or producing in contract farming) have differ-
ent production functions. They verify empirically whether the mar-
ginal return on observable characteristics differs between both
regimes, the difference being the net-effect. This approach requires
a relatively large sample size to accurately estimate the various
parameters involved in both regressions. Moreover, switching
regressions require a proper instrument (Instrumental Variable –
IV) that can explain the decision of farmers to participate in con-
tract farming, but is uncorrelated with the error term of the regres-
sion to estimate the income effects in this regime. Also, the
estimate of the effect size is more sensitive to specification errors.
Out of the three endogenous switching regression models, two
were considered to have a medium risk of bias because their
instruments were found to be not strong enough (Narayanan,
2014; Rao & Qaim, 2011), whereas the instruments in the
Escobal and Cavero (2012) study were considered to have a high
risk of bias on ‘mechanism of assignment’ (see Table 2).4.2.2.2. Propensity score Matching models. PSM is a non-parametric
approach to resolving this selection bias. It is appropriate when the
assumption of constant returns on inputs across regimes holds. It
compares farmers that differ least in key characteristics. To do
so, the method assumes that all important household characteris-
tics determining participation in contract farming are observable.
Hence, conditional on these selection variables, differences in
terms of the income level between the matched comparison and
treatment groups are assumed to occur randomly and can be
attributed to the treatment. Ideally, matching relies on baseline
data, i.e. before the availability of contract farming in the region,
because, due to the contract farming, these characteristics could
have changed over time. We found, however, that none of the stud-
ies had used a baseline survey; all studies are cross-sectional, using
the information collected in one survey round. Maertens and
Swinnen (2009) and Ito et al. (2012) used recall of the baseline con-
ditions to match treatment and control groups. Most PSM studies
Table 2
Risk of bias assessment.
Notes: ‘Low’ refers to low risk of bias in the relevant domain; ‘high’ refers to high risk of bias; ‘unclear’ means that information was not reported in order to assess bias; more
details on the risk of bias assessment are published in the full report of this systematic review (Ton, Desiere, Vellema, Weituschat, & D’Haese, 2017).
G. Ton et al. /World Development 104 (2018) 46–64 53matched contracted and non-contracted farmers based on current
household characteristics, such as total landholdings, household
size and age of the head of the household, and considered these
time-invariant or unlikely to be affected by participation in con-
tract farming.
4.2.2.3. Instrumental variable and two-staged Heckman models. Four
studies used an IV approach and eight studies used a Heckman
selection model to resolve the issue of selection bias. Both
approaches require an instrument that can explain why a certain
type of farmer may decide to participate in contract farming in
order to control for this selection bias in the net-effect estimation.
A good instrument needs to be correlated with the choice that
farmers have to participate in contract farming but uncorrelated
with the error term in the regression with income as the indepen-
dent variable. The quest for such an instrument is challenging. Dis-
tance of the household to a relevant location was frequently used
as an instrumental variable. Two studies used more sophisticated
instruments to capture differences in behavioural characteristics
that predict contract uptake: a contingent valuation experiment
(Bellemare, 2012) and a proxy for honesty (Warning & Key,
2002). In Table 2, the instruments used in five studies were classi-
fied as having a medium risk of being endogenous, whereas the
instruments in seven studies were considered to have a high risk
of bias.
4.2.3. Selective reporting bias
Studies were considered guilty of selective outcome reporting
when the authors did have data on a (more) relevant outcome vari-
able but chose to base their main analysis on another outcome
variable. An example of this was the study by Warning and Key(2002), who used agricultural income in their main analysis
because household income proved not to be significantly different
between the groups. For example, Miyata et al. (2009) in their
paper on contract farming in apples and green onions, report
descriptive statistics separately for each crop. These statistics show
clear differences between both groups. However, in the main anal-
ysis, both crops are grouped together, such that these differences
are no longer visible. Both forms of selective reporting may be con-
sidered as a kind of publication bias, with authors reporting only
those outcomes which show a significant effect, as insignificant
results are unlikely to be published.4.2.4. Spillover effects
None of the studies included in the meta-analyses explicitly
addressed spillovers or contamination effects of the control group.
However, since most studies sampled the control group from the
same village as the treatment group, contamination might be a
concern. For this reason, we scored bias due to spillovers as ‘un-
clear’ in the risk of bias assessment. Arguably, spillovers are less
of an issue for impact evaluations of contract farming than for
many other impact evaluations, because in most regions only a
minority of the farmers participate in contract farming, limiting
general equilibrium effects, and because most contractual arrange-
ments do not focus on technology adoption, limiting spillovers
through learning. Moreover, the impact of contract farming is not
static but likely to evolve over time. For instance, the impact on
income may increase over time as farmers and the firm learn and
optimise production processes. These dynamic spillovers were
not addressed by any of the studies. Assessing such dynamic
effects would require panel studies or repeated representative sur-
veys, while all selected studies used one survey for the cross-
Overall  (I-squared = 89.0%, p = 0.000)
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Fig. 3. Forest plot of the effect of contract farming on income: all empirical instances.
54 G. Ton et al. /World Development 104 (2018) 46–64sectional data analysis. Also, few studies clearly state when con-
tracts were first offered to farmers or discuss how the impact
may have changed over time.4.2.5. Other sources of bias
All studies attempted to select contracted and non-contracted
farmers randomly – although this at times required some creative
thinking. However, all were selected within certain geographical
locations in a region that may not necessarily be representative
of the whole country. Most likely, contractual arrangements were
set up in regions which benefited from external factors such as rel-
atively good access to infrastructure or nearby processing facilities.
Most studies provided relatively little information to assess such
external factors, which makes it challenging to determine the
external validity of their findings. More important was the risk
due to drop-out dynamics. Most studies took place some years
after the contractual arrangement had been in place. The surveys
use different methods to resolve this selection bias. However, there
is still a risk of bias to the treatment estimates because some farm-
ers could have stopped the arrangement in these early years, for
example, due to low income effects. These drop-out dynamics
can only be measured and controlled for unambiguously with
baseline sampling. Several studies explicitly mentioned drop-out
dynamics in the years before the research took place (Jones &
Gibbon, 2011; Miyata et al., 2009; Ramaswami et al., 2009;
Saigenji, 2012; Sethboonsarng et al., 2008; Simmons et al., 2005;
Sokchea & Culas, 2015; Wainaina et al., 2014). We consider
endogenous switching regression models and Heckman models
as being relatively unaffected by this bias, as they use a modelling
approach to estimate net-effects. The other methods use an arith-metic comparison between the outcomes of (matched) participants
and non-participants, and, without baseline or follow-up measure-
ments, their effect estimate is more vulnerable for this source of
bias of the treatment estimates.4.3. Meta-analysis
4.3.1. Pooled average effect
Twenty-two studies could be included in the meta-analysis of
income effects. These papers covered 28 empirical instances of
contract farming but only provided effectiveness estimates for 26
of them. The forest plot shows the size of the effect of contract
farming on income per empirical instance (Fig. 3). In the 26 empir-
ical instances covered, contract farming increased income on aver-
age by 63% (RR = 1.63, CI = 1.41–1.89). Out of the 26 empirical
instances, only two reported a negative effect on income, and even
in these studies, the negative effect was not significantly different
from zero. Five studies reported that contract farming more than
doubled income. The largest effect was reported by Narayanan
(2014), who found that contract farming of broiler chickens
increased incomemore than 17-fold. The substantial heterogeneity
between studies was confirmed by the low Tau-squared and the
large I-squared statistic. The I-squared statistics indicated that
89% of the variation might be attributed to heterogeneity between
studies rather than sampling variation within studies.
Fig. 4 differentiates the type of contractual arrangement accord-
ing to broad categories of production (annual crops, perennial
crops and animal products) and estimates pooled average effects
in each of these subgroups. We are aware of the wide heterogene-
ity within these groups, and, therefore, present in each forest plot
..
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Fig. 4. Forest plot of the effect of contract farming on income per crop type.
G. Ton et al. /World Development 104 (2018) 46–64 55the type of production and location of each empirical instance, to
facilitate interpretation of the results.4.3.2. Sensitivity analysis
We used a sensitivity analysis to examine whether the esti-
mated pooled effect size was sensitive to some research design
attributes. The empirical instance of broiler production in India
(Narayanan, 2014) had a particularly large effect on the pooled
effect estimate. This large response ratio reflects the very low alter-
native income measured for non-contracted farmers living in the
same area, using the same plot size for activities other than broiler
chicken production. Typically, broiler production takes place in
sheds, on small plots, and located near urban areas, and, therefore,
alternative agricultural income is low. A comparison with other
(non-agricultural) investment opportunities in the urban area
would likely have provided a more probable counterfactual situa-
tion of the broiler producers. Excluding this empirical instance
reduced the pooled response ratio from 1.63 (CI = 1.41–1.89) to
1.50 (CI = 1.32–1.70).
Pooled effect estimates differed with respect to the reported
outcome variable. In line with expectations, contract farming had
a less pronounced effect when household income (RR = 1.32, CI =
1.13–1.54) was measured, compared with studies in which farm-
ing income (RR = 1.65, CI = 1.17–2.33) or income from the con-
tracted crop (RR = 1.92, CI = 1.47–2.50) was measured. The
variance was very high, which means that these differences were
not statistically significant. However, these results do suggest that
substitution effects may play a role, i.e. substituting land and
labour from other activities towards the crop under contract. The
two studies that measured income by consumption expenditure(RR = 1.15, CI = 0.92–1.42) reported lower response ratios than
studies that measured income (RR = 1.69, CI = 1.45–1.96). By con-
trast, no difference in RRs was observed between studies reporting
net income (RR = 1.70, CI = 1.42–2.04) or gross income (revenue)
(RR = 1.68, CI = 1.33–2.11).4.4. Assessment of publication bias
Scientific articles are more likely to be written and published
when they find a significant effect of the programme being evalu-
ated (Ioannidis, 2005; Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2007). This publica-
tion bias is apparent in the studies that we selected for meta-
analysis, as only three of the 22 studies report insignificant or neg-
ative income effects of contract farming (Cahyadi & Waibel, 2011;
Narayanan, 2014; Simmons et al., 2005). Notably, two of these
three papers evaluated more than one empirical instance of con-
tract farming, and reported a positive effect in at least one other
instance. This strongly suggests that the academic literature on
contract farming is biased towards studies that find significant
effects. The pooled average effect sizes that result from the meta-
analysis will inevitably overestimate the ‘true’ effect of contract
farming on income because (many) studies with insignificant
effects could not be included in the meta-analysis.
Furthermore, publication bias was assessed visually using fun-
nel plots and Egger’s statistical test. In the absence of publication
bias, the effect size of the different studies should be distributed
symmetrically around the average effect size (the vertical line in
the funnel plot). The effect size of studies with low precision, plot-
ted at the bottom of the graph, are likely to deviate more from the
pooled effect size than the effect size of studies with higher preci-
Table 3
Results of the Egger’s test.
(1)
Egger’s test on all
empirical instances
(2)
Egger’s test using a
synthetic effect for instances
reported by Narayanan
Log standard error 1.34* 2.41***
(1.8) (4.8)
Constant 0.26 0.06
(1.51) (0.81)
Observations 26 23
R-squared adjusted 24% 66%
F-statistic 3.27 23.0
tau-sq 0.15 0.01
I-sq 76% 42%
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
Fig. 6. Funnel plot: replacing the four effect sizes in Narayanan (2014) by its
synthetic effect size.
Fig. 5. Funnel plot.
56 G. Ton et al. /World Development 104 (2018) 46–64sion, plotted at the top of the graph, creating a funnel-shaped dis-
tribution. The funnel plot of the studies that measured income
effects (Fig. 5) of contract farming is clearly not symmetrical
around the pooled effect estimate. Most studies are outside the
95% confidence interval, marked by the dashed lines in the funnel
plot. This asymmetry shows that there was a strong tendency to
publish only statistically significant positive effects, which wasconfirmed by Egger’s test (Table 3). This test formalises the
approach by regressing the effect size on its standard error. In
the absence of publication bias, the correlation between effect size
and its standard error should be zero. Instead, we found a signifi-
cant statistical correlation between both variables (p <.10). The
funnel plot shows a highly imprecise estimated effect size reported
by Narayanan (2014) for contract farming of gherkins (the dot at
the bottom) and the extremely high effect size for broiler chickens
(the dot at the right-hand side of the funnel plot). To reduce the
sensitivity of the result to these observations, we replaced the four
effect sizes reported by Narayanan (2014) with its average syn-
thetic effect size and redrew the funnel plot (Fig. 6) and re-
conducted the meta-regression. This confirms that publication bias
is a concern and also the importance of appropriate analysis of
dependency: the funnel plot is even more asymmetrical and the
correlation between effect size and its standard error is highly sig-
nificant (p <.01).
When we assume that the published studies report positive and
negative effects of contract farming to a similar extent, we can par-
tially control for the absence of the non-significant findings in the
estimation of the pooled average income effect, using a trim-and-
fill analysis (Duval & Tweedie, 2000). This method exploits the fact
that, without publication bias, a funnel plot can be expected to be
symmetrical and also includes the less favourable results (these are
the observations on the left-hand side of the funnel plot). To mimic
the random distribution around the mean, the trim-and-fill exer-
cise adds non-existent studies to the funnel plot to achieve this
symmetry. The pooled effect size is subsequently re-estimated by
including these non-existent studies. However, the results from
trim-and-fill methods need to be treated with caution when there
is substantial between-study heterogeneity (Peters, Sutton, Jones,
Abrams, & Rushton, 2007), which is clearly the case in our meta-
analysis of contract farming. The fill-and-trim analysis added seven
non-existent studies to the funnel plot (Fig. 7) and re-estimated the
overall effect as a response rate of 1.38 (CI = 1.23–1.55). In other
words, the positive impact of contract farming on income
decreased but remained significant once this aspect of publication
bias is accounted for.4.5. Assessment of survivor bias
In addition to publication bias, the meta-analysis is affected by
survivor bias, which causes an overestimation of the pooled aver-
age effectiveness of contract farming. All studies used cross-
sectional surveys to assess effectiveness after the contract farming
arrangement had been in place for several years (see Table 4). Of
the 14 cases for which data were available the firm’s contract
scheme, six had been in place for more than 12 years at the time
when the first data were collected. Therefore, logically, all the
empirical instances of contract farming covered by the studies
needed to be operational at the time of the research. This implies
that per definition the meta-analysis did not include studies on
contract farming arrangements that had ceased. All empirical
instances of contract farming had survived the initial tensions
between firm and farmer about prices, services and quality
requirements, which are mentioned in the literature as being
important challenges to contract farming (Barrett et al., 2012;
Bijman, 2008; Da Silva & Rankin, 2013; Eaton & Shepherd, 2001;
FAO, 2008; Narayanan, 2013; Oya, 2012; Prowse, 2012;
UNIDROIT-FAO, 2016; Will, 2013; Williamson, 2003). Because
failed attempts to establish a functional contractual relationship
could not be studied with a cross-sectional design, their results
could not be included in the meta-analysis. Therefore, the pooled
average effect size is an upward-biased estimate of the effective-
ness of contract farming. Nevertheless, the response rates may well
Fig. 7. Filled funnel plot, using the synthetic effect for Narayanan (2014).
Table 4
Timing of impact evaluation and start of contract farming.
Author Country Product Start of the contractual arrangement Year of the impact
evaluation
Awotide et al. (2015) Nigeria Rice No unique contractual arrangement 2013
Bellemare (2012) Madagascar Green beans, leek, snow peas, rice, barley The main company operates since the early 1990 s 2008
Bolwig et al. (2009) Uganda Coffee 2000 2005
Cahyadi and Waibel (2011) Indonesia Oil palm Two periods: 1989–1994 and 1995–2000. 2010
Escobal and Cavero (2012) Peru Potato 2000 2002/2003
Girma and Gardebroek (2015) Ethiopia Honey 2007 2009
Ito et al. (2012) China Watermelon 2000 2009
Jones and Gibbon (2011) Uganda Cocoa 2001/2002 2005 & 2009
Maertens and Swinnen (2009) Senegal French beans No unique contractual arrangement. 2005
Miyata et al. (2009) China Apples, green onions No details 2005
Narayanan (2014) India Marigold, papaya, broiler, gherkins No details 2009/2010
Ramaswami et al. (2009) India Broiler No details 2002/2003
Rao and Qaim (2011) Kenya Various vegetables No unique contractual arrangement 2008
Saigenji, 2012 Vietnam Tea 1950s 2007
Sethboonsarng et al. (2008) Laos Rice 2002 2004
Simmons et al. (2005) Indonesia Seed rice 1988 2002
Simmons et al. (2005) Indonesia Broiler 1998 2002
Sokchea and Culas (2015) Cambodia Rice 2003 2010
Trifkovic´ (2014) Vietnam Catfish No unique contractual arrangement 2010
Wainaina et al. (2014) Kenya Broiler No details 2010/2011
Wang et al. (2014) Vietnam Various vegetables Multiple firms involved, since 1995 2007/2008
Warning and Key (2002) Senegal Peanuts 1990 1992/1994
Winters et al. (2005) Indonesia Seed corn 1986 2002
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arrangements to be maintained over time.
4.6. Beneficiary analysis
All included studies had a design and reporting quality that
made it possible to extract the indicators used to assess differences
between participating and non-participating farmers. Table 5 sum-
marises the indicators used to assess whether the contractual
arrangements were accepted by larger or smaller farmers, and by
asset-rich or asset-poor farmers. These indicators were extracted
from the descriptive statistics on characteristics of the treatment
and comparison group (T- or Z-tests) or, when not reported, from
the results of the econometric analysis to determine the factors
that influence participation in the contract farming arrangement,
usually a Probit analysis. Generally, the results of the T-tests onthe descriptives, and the results of the first stage regressions (usu-
ally Probit models) coincided. However, when the results did differ,
we used the more straightforward T-test on the treatment and
comparison groups, because in the Probit analysis, differences
between participants and non-participants are not always reflected
as significant coefficients in the regression due to collinearity with
other variables in the equation.
In 52% of the studies, the contracted farmers (12 out of 23) had
significantly more land. Only in 17% of the cases (4 out of 23) did
participation in contract farming involve the relatively small farms.
With the exception of broiler farming, the instances of contract
farming that involved the smaller farms showed substantially
lower income effects (response ratios) than the average, which
suggests that for the larger farmers these relatively lower benefits
might not outweigh the costs of participating in the contract.
When differences in asset endowments between contracted and
Table 5
Assessment of differences in scale and wealth between participants and non-participants.
Author Product Proxy-indicators for scale ++ +  Proxy-indicators for wealth ++ +  Effect size
1 Awotide et al. (2015) rice none none 1.71
2 Bellemare (2012) various crops landholding 1 equipment and inputs 1 1.55
3 Bolwig et al. (2009) coffee number of trees, farm size 1 (house) walls 1 1.92
4 Cahyadi and Waibel (2011) oil palm land size 1 total assets 1 1.24
5 Escobal and Cavero (2012) potato land size 1 productive assets 1 1.76
6 Girma and Gardebroek (2015) honey traditional hives 1 none 2.19
7 Ito et al. (2012) watermelon none (area watermelon) total assets 1 1.56
8 Jones and Gibbon (2011) cocoa farm size, cocoa trees 1 none 1.52
9 Maertens and Swinnen (2009) green beans landholding in 1995 1 non-land assets 1 3.23
10* Miyata et al. (2009) apples land cultivated, irrigated 1 agricultural assets 1 1.27
11* Miyata et al. (2009) green onions land cultivated, irrigated 1 agricultural assets 1
12 Narayanan (2014) gherkins land owned 1 none 1.27
13 Narayanan (2014) marigold land owned 1 none 0.52
14 Narayanan (2014) papaya land owned 1 none 1.43
15 Narayanan (2014) broiler land owned 1 none 17.6
16 Ramaswami et al. (2009) broiler (un)irrigated lands 1 none 1.85
17 Rao and Qaim (2011) various crops land area 1 none 1.48
18** Saigenji (2012) state - tea none none no data
19 Saigenji (2012) private - tea none none 1.04
20* Sethboonsarng et al. (2008) rice none none 1.80
21 Simmons et al. (2005) broiler dry and irrigated land 1 (non)agric. assets, 1 4.91
22 Simmons et al. (2005) seed rice dry and irrigated land 1 (non)agric. assets 1 0.94
23 Sokchea and Culas (2015) rice cultivated land 1 agric. equipment 1 1.85
24 Trifkovic´ (2014, 2016) catfish aquaculture area 1 asset index 1 1.29
25 Wainaina et al. (2014) broiler land size 1 total assets 1 1.31
26 Wang et al. (2014) various crops total land area 1 none 1.37
27 Warning and Key (2002) peanuts land cultivated 1 agric. equipment 1 1.29
28 Winters et al. (2005) seed corn (irrigated) area operated 1 assets incl. land 1 3.05
TOTAL 12 7 4 10 4 1
* Analysed as one instance in meta-analysis.
** Not part of meta-analysis.
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containing such information – the tendency to contract relatively
better-endowed farmers was even more accentuated. Only in one
of the 15 studies that provided data on assets did contract farmers
have significantly fewer assets than the comparison group; in 66%
of the cases, contracted farmers were significantly wealthier in
terms of assets (10 out of 15). When we combine both analyses,
we see that in at least 61% of the empirical instances covered in
the studies the contracted farmers were better off than the non-
contracted farmers in the sample.
4.7. Heterogeneity analysis
4.7.1. Moderator analysis
A moderator analysis examined whether the estimated pooled
effects differed with respect to (1) type of production; (2) conti-
nent; and (3) contract characteristics (Table 6). Contract farming
of animal products was more remunerative than annual or peren-
nial products. The positive effect of contract farming on income did
not differ between continents. Contract farming arrangements
involving a pre-existing cooperative show lower income effects.
The offering of a price that is substantially higher than in the local
market (price premium) is associated with higher income effects.
All contractual arrangements studied included services provided
by the firm to the farmer. Five services were frequently encoun-
tered as part of the contractual arrangement: credit, (improved)
seeds, agrochemicals, extension and transport. The absence of a
cooperative when the contract started, and presence of a price pre-
mium, transport services, and the provisioning of credit, access to
key inputs and/or extension services are all statistically significant
moderators. It is noteworthy that contracts providing for transport
had a substantially larger impact on income (RR = 2.49, CI = 1.69–
3.66) than contracts that did not include transport (RR = 1.41, CI
= 1.24–1.61). This highlights that access to a distant marketthrough transport provided by a firm might be one of the main
benefits of contract farming (Ochieng, Veettil, & Qaim, 2017).
Contractual arrangements were classified as having a ‘high level
of service provisioning’ if they provided at least three of the five
services, and as having a ‘low level of service provisioning’ if they
offered fewer than three services. The service index confirms that
contractual arrangements offering at least three services were
associated with significantly larger effects on income (RR = 1.78,
CI = 1.44–2.19) than those offering fewer services (RR = 1.43, CI =
1.23–1.66). As these moderator variables may suffer from
collinearity, we explore these differences in more detail in the next
section using a meta-regression.
4.7.2. Meta-regression
Meta-regressions were conducted to control for several sensi-
tivity and moderator variables simultaneously (Table 7). We only
included variables that were shown to be statistically significant
in the sensitivity analyses and the level of service provisioning,
in order to preserve degrees of freedom. Nevertheless, the power
of the analyses was low and the results should be interpreted with
care. The first and second regressions only included the main mod-
erator and sensitivity variables, respectively. The third regression
included all moderator and sensitivity variables simultaneously,
whereas the fourth regression included all variables that were sig-
nificant in at least one of the previous regressions. Model 4 shows
that the two studies that measured income by expenditure were
associated with lower RRs compared with other methods that cal-
culated income from recalled production data. However, this effect
disappears in the fifth regression, when the log of the standard
errors was included to reduce publication bias. The analyses con-
firmed the sensitivity of the results to the single empirical instance
of broiler farming in India (Narayanan, 2014). It is important to
note that the level of service provisioning becomes an insignificant
variable in these regressions. The direction of the coefficients in the
Table 6
Moderator analyses.a
ES 95% confidence
intervals
Q tau_sq I_sq Sample size
Type of production
Animal husbandry 2.69** 1.55 4.65 75.42 0.40 93.37 6
Annual crop 1.47 1.29 1.68 30.46 0.03 54.04 15
Perennial crop 1.35 1.07 1.70 46.50 0.06 89.25 6
Perishable product 1.61 1.31 1.98 129.61 0.10 89.20 16
Non-perishable product 1.63 1.37 1.94 29.92 0.05 69.92 10
Region
Africa 1.59 1.42 1.77 13.22 0.01 39.47 9
Asia 1.64 1.34 2.00 142.27 0.11 88.75 17
South-America 1.76 1.14 2.74 0.00 0.00 100.00 1
Contract characteristics
Existing cooperative
Yes 1.41 1.17 1.70 60.53 0.06 85.13 10
No 1.80** 1.47 2.20 89.90 0.11 82.20 17
Price premium
Yes 1.65** 1.51 1.81 12.64 0.00 5.07 13
No 1.50 1.23 1.84 133.80 0.10 91.03 13
Transport
Yes 2.49** 1.69 3.66 65.46 0.24 89.31 8
No 1.41 1.24 1.61 99.26 0.05 81.87 19
Credit
Yes 1.65** 1.51 1.81 12.64 0.00 5.07 13
No 1.43 1.28 1.61 27.25 0.02 52.30 14
Seeds
Yes 1.64 1.36 1.98 172.23 0.11 89.55 19
No 1.58 1.38 1.81 11.86 0.01 40.97 8
Key inputs
Yes 1.72* 1.43 2.06 187.20 0.11 89.85 20
No 1.47 1.22 1.77 18.43 0.04 67.44 7
Extension services
Yes 1.70** 1.43 2.02 220.18 0.12 90.01 23
No 1.36 1.22 1.52 2.14 0.00 0.00 4
Level of services provisioning
High 1.78** 1.44 2.19 181.22 0.15 90.07 19
Low 1.43 1.23 1.66 20.08 0.03 65.14 8
* Significantly higher with p < .10; ** p < .05.
a Apples and onions in Miyata et al. (2009) are analysed as two separate instances of contract farming.
Table 7
Meta-regression on influencing factors for income effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Animal husbandry (compared to annual crops) 0.518* 0.168 0.205 0.159
(2.02) (1.04) (1.40) (1.12)
Household income (compared to using expenditure data) 0.206 0.284 0.349** 0.231
(1.26) (1.43) (2.18) (1.38)
Farming income (compared with household income) 0.0214 0.0312
(0.14) (0.19)
Crop income (compared with household income) 0.156 0.103
(1.18) (0.68)
Low level of service provisioning (compared with high service provisioning) 0.132 0.0193 0.0147 0.0020
(0.59) (00.16) (0.13) (0.02)
Dummy for outlier case of broiler farming in India 2.371*** 2.244*** 2.265*** 2.175***
(5.59) (5.07) (3.31) (5.09)
Log of standard error (as indicator of study preciseness) 0.849
(1.44)
Constant 0.444*** 0.136 0.070 0.051 0.032
(3.00) (1.05) (0.40) (0.31) (0.21)
Observations 26 26 26 26 26
R-squared adjusted 9.1% 90.2% 85.7% 86.3% 89.0%
F-statistic 2.464 10.31 6.782 10.79 9.35
tau-sq 0.202 0.0222 0.0318 0.0305 0.0245
I-sq 87.5% 59.4% 57.3% 57.1% 55.3%
* Significant difference with p < .10; ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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become significant with a higher sample size, i.e. a larger number
of impact studies.4.7.3. Qualitative comparative analysis
The moderator analysis points to several possible enablers of
effectiveness of contract farming. However, these moderating
Table 8
Overview of the cases used in the qualitative comparative analysis.*
Empirical instances of
contract farming
Existing farmer
organisation (fuzzy)
Price
premium
(fuzzy)
Credit
(fuzzy)
Key inputs
(fuzzy)
Income effect
response ratio (scale)
Relatively high income
effects (fuzzy)
Relatively low income
effects (fuzzy)
rice_nigeria 0.8 0 0 1 1.71 1 0
beans_madag 0.8 1 1 1 1.55 0.97 0.03
coffee_uganda 0 1 0 0.2 1.92 1 0
oilpalm_indon 0 0 0.8 1 1.24 0.47 0.53
potato_peru 0 1 0 0 1.76 1 0
honey_ethiop 0 1 1 1 2.19 1 0
wmelon_china 0.2 1 0 1 1.56 0.98 0.02
cocoa_uganda 0 1 0 0 1.52 0.96 0.04
beans_senegal 0.2 1 1 1 3.23 1 0
apples_china 0.8 0 0.8 1 1.27 0.56 0.44
onions_china 0 0 0.8 1 1.27 0.56 0.44
broiler_n_india 0 0 1 1 17.64 1 0
gherkins_india 0 1 0.2 1 1.27 0.56 0.44
marigold_india 0 0 0 0.8 0.52 0 1
papaya_india 0 1 0.2 0.8 1.43 0.9 0.1
vegetables_kenya 0.8 0 0 0 1.48 0.94 0.06
broiler_w_india 0 0 1 1 1.85 1 0
tea_vietnam 1 0 1 1 1.04 0.07 0.93
rice_laos 0.2 1 0.8 1 1.8 1 0
broiler_indon 0 0 1 1 4.91 1 0
seedcorn_indon 1 1 1 1 3.05 1 0
rice_cambodia 1 1 0 0 1.85 1 0
fish_vietnam 0 0 0 1 1.29 0.62 0.38
roiler_kenya 0 0 0.8 0.8 1.31 0.67 0.3
vegetables_vietnam 0.8 1 0 0 1.37 0.81 0.19
peanuts_senegal 0.2 0 0 1 1.29 0.62 0.38
seedrice_indon 1 1 0 1 0.94 0.02 0.98
* The fuzz-set scores >0.8 indicate that the case is considered as part of the group of cases sharing the condition.
Table 9
Truth table of contract farming related to perennial crops.
Existing farmer
organisation
Price
premium
Credit Key
inputs
N Set
consistency
Outcome is highly
effective
Highly effective cases Low-effective cases
Not Present Not Present 1 1 True papaya_india –
Not Present Not Not 2 0.98 True coffee_uganda;
cocoa_uganda
–
Not Not Present Present 1 0.67 False – oilpalm_indonesia
Present Not Present Present 2 0.35 False – apples_china;
tea_vietnam
60 G. Ton et al. /World Development 104 (2018) 46–64effects disappear in the meta-regression when controlling for all of
them together. The reason for this is twofold. First, the sample size
for the regression is quite small, which precludes detection of mod-
erators with acceptable statistical significance. Second, it is possi-
ble that some moderators enable effectiveness in certain
contextual conditions only. Therefore, we used QCA to explore
for combinations of conditions in the data set that are consistently
related to highly effective instances of contract farming.
Table 8 maps the empirical instances of contract farming cov-
ered in the meta-analysis on four conditions that we hypothesised
as being the most important moderators: existing cooperative
involved (present/not present), price premium above local market
(true/false), provisioning of credit in cash (present/not present),
and provisioning of key inputs (present/not present). To make
the analysis less sensitive for the threshold chosen to differentiate
between highly and less effective instances of contract farming, we
used fuzzy-set scores, using the pooled average effect size of 1.38
as the crossover point, and a response rate of 1.50 as the threshold
value to define the relatively high and 1.25 to define the relatively
less effective contractual arrangements. Intermediate values (1.25
< RR<1.50) were converted into fuzzy-set scores using the logistic
function provided by the software application fsQCA (Charles
Ragin & Davey, 2009). For some studies, we could not classify theempirical instance as ‘present’ or ‘absent’ without caveats, due to
missing information, and we used fuzzy-set scores to account for
this uncertainty. A fuzzy-set score of 0.2 means that the condition
is most likely absent, whereas 0.8 indicates that it is most likely
present. This ‘missing value’ scoring was based on contextual infor-
mation from a wider set of publications that report on similar con-
tract farming arrangements in the same area.
Table 8 provides an overview of all empirical instances covered
in the studies according to the logical combination of incentives
and services provided in the contracts and whether these are con-
sistently related to relatively high or relatively low effects on
income.
We expected that some combinations of conditions could be
either enablers of or barriers to effectiveness in a certain type of
production and not in others. Therefore, we present the truth
tables separately for perennial crops, annual crops and animal hus-
bandry. The four conditions result in a truth table with 16 rows (24)
containing all possible combinations. For presentation purposes,
we excluded the logical combinations of conditions that are not
covered by the cases in the sample (so-called ‘logical remainders’).
For the six contractual arrangements related to perennial crops
(Table 9), we found suggestive evidence that a price premium may
be essential in the incentive structure for high effectiveness. It was
Table 11
Truth table with contract farming arrangements related to animal husbandry.
Existing farmer
organisation
Price
premium
Credit Key
inputs
N Set
consistency
Outcome is highly
effective
Highly effective
cases
Low-effective
cases
Not Present Present Present 1 1 True honey_ethiopia –
Not Not Present Present 4 0.97 Likely broiler_indonesia;
broiler_n_india;
broiler_w_india
broiler_kenya
Not Not Not Present 1 0.68 False – fish_vietnam
Table 10
Truth table of contract farming related to annual crops.
Existing farmer
organisation
Price
premium
Credit Key
inputs
N Set
consistency
Outcome is highly
effective
Highly effective
cases
Low-effective
cases
Present Present Present Present 2 1 True beans_madagascar;
seedcorn_indonesia
–
Present Not Not Present 1 1 True rice_nigeria –
Present Not Not Not 1 1 True vegetables_kenya –
Not Present Present Present 2 1 True beans_senegal;
rice_laos
–
Not Present Not Not 1 1 True potatoes_peru –
Not Present Not Present 2 0.87 Unclear watermelon_china gherkins_india
Present Present Not Not 3 0.65 Unclear rice_cambodia;
vegetables_vietnam
seedrice_indonesia
Not Not Present Present 1 0.7 False – onions_china
Not Not Not Present 2 0.51 False – marigold_india;
peanuts_senegal
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less-effective cases. Moreover, credit as part of the service package
seemed consistently related to cases that exhibit lower effective-
ness. This suggests that in perennial crops, due to credit obligations
or indebtedness, farmers may not opt out of contractual arrange-
ments that yield relatively low income effects.
For annual crops (Table 10), a price premium in combination
with credit and inputs appeared as an important component of
the incentive package of highly effective contract farming arrange-
ments. It was absent in only two of the highly effective cases, and
in both cases, we see that existing farmer organisations were
involved in brokering and governing the contractual arrangements.
This suggests that a price premium is required for a contractual
arrangement to become highly effective on income, especially
when cooperatives cannot serve as an intermediary between the
firm and the farmer.
For the animal husbandry cases (Table 11), the provision of both
inputs and credit in combination appears a likely enabler of effec-
tiveness, as evidenced by its presence in all highly effective con-
tract arrangements related to animal husbandry, except the
Kenyan broiler case.
5. Discussion and implications
We applied a meta-analysis on 22 studies that reported income
effects in 26 empirical instances of contract farming. Based on the
significance levels and effect sizes, we have shown that these stud-
ies suffered from publication bias. All studies reported at least one
empirical instance with a statistically significant positive income
effect. Test results suggested that studies with non-significant
effects of contract farming are likely to exist but are systematically
underreported in the academic literature. A trim-and-fill exercise
to partially reduce this publication bias resulted in a pooled aver-
age effect-size of between 23% and 55% (RR = 1.38; CI = 1.23–
1.55). However, this is still an overestimation of the positive effects
because studies also suffer from survivor bias. All studies are cross-
sectional studies that assess the effectiveness of the contractual
arrangement only after a period in which the contractual arrange-ments had already survived initial start-up problems. This implies
that contractual arrangements had ceased to function before the
research would have started are absent in the literature, and in this
systematic review.
Participation in contract farming tends to involve farmers that
are wealthier in terms of land or other assets. In 61% of the studies,
the contracted farmers had significantly larger plot-sizes or were
richer in assets than the non-participating farmers. Only in 11%
of the cases (3 out of 26) were contracted farmers significantly less
well off, and two of these instances showed relatively low income
effects compared to the average in the sample. This suggests that
the relatively better-off farmers, having more market alternatives
and higher risk-bearing capacities, opt out of contracts that do
not compensate for the costs implied.
Using QCA, we detected combinations of conditions that may
predict relatively high income effects for farmers from the contrac-
tual arrangement that is offered to them. These differ according to
crop type.
For perennial crops, a price premium was consistently present
in all empirical instances with relatively high income effects. Credit
is part of the embedded service package only in the less effective
instances of contract farming. For annual crops, a price premium
seemed to be a necessary component of the service package to
result in relatively high income effects for farmers (RR > 1.50),
especially in situations where there was no cooperative involved.
Price premiums are more likely when firms sell (certified) products
in niche markets (Swinnen & Vandeplas, 2011), and is less promi-
nent in unprocessed staple crops (Maertens & Vande Velde, 2017).
In animal husbandry, the combination of ‘credit and inputs’ was
present in all highly effective contractual arrangements, especially
in broiler chicken production.
The meta-analysis of a small and widely heterogeneous sample
of empirical instances of contract farming implies important con-
struct validity threats, for example to the definition of ‘contract
farming’, ‘annual crops’, ‘animal production, ‘smallholders’, which
constrain the generalisation domain of our inferences. Therefore,
in the forest plots and tables, we also provide information about
the type of production and location of each empirical instance in
Fig. 8. Generalisation domain of the pooled average effect-size.
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tation of our findings.
These inferences derived from the systematic review have a
constrained generalisation domain. The mandatory screening of
studies on the risk of bias to their net-effect estimates resulted in
a limited number of studies (22) and empirical instances (26),
which do not cover the whole range of sectors in which contract
farming is an important modality of procurement (e.g. sugar, dairy,
barley, banana, asparagus, fresh fruits). Nor do they cover the
entire palette of analytical methods used in the social sciences;
net-effect studies represent only one of the research approaches
needed to inform reflections on the effectiveness of development
interventions (Ton, 2015). Fig. 8 illustrates the iterative process
of meta-analysis used to arrive at an estimate of the pooled aver-
age effect-size that seems closest to the real effect-size of enduring
contract farming arrangements.
We show that there are important methodological advances in
how net-effect estimates are derived from (cross-sectional) survey
data with econometric methods. These include new survey ques-
tions to obtain appropriate instrumental variables to control for
selection bias, as well as switching regressions that model farm
outcomes according to crop-specific production functions instead
of estimating these with an overall production function. New stud-
ies need to build on these methodological advances. Nevertheless,
we show that most studies still face a risk of bias due to imperfect
group identification and weak instruments, especially because the
data is cross-sectional and hence relied on only one measurement
in time without a proper baseline or follow-up measurements
(McKenzie, 2012).
The results of the review provide a wake-up call for researchers
to carefully craft their research designs in order to maximise the
generalisability of their context-specific findings. A better specifi-
cation of the services provided by the firm to the farmer would
undoubtedly increase the relevance of the research for develop-
ment practitioners and governments. Because many contract farm-
ing arrangements imply the adoption of new inputs, new crops,
and new ways of horizontal coordination (farmer groups), the
effect of ‘contract farming’ could equally be presented as the result
of ‘new inputs’, ‘access to credit’ or ‘collective marketing’. This
would not change the empirical analysis, but it would make the
fact that a contract is signed a less important feature. More exper-
imenting with varying service packages in each empirical instance
would help to better identify the package components and contex-
tual conditions that drive effectiveness in each contractual
arrangement.Moreover, we draw attention to the apparent publication and
survivor bias in the existing knowledge base on contract farming.
Therefore, new research should try to document also the less-
successful instances, for example by following multiple contract
farming schemes from the start (Narayanan, 2014). Researchers
and journals should be more open to publish methodologically
sound studies even when results are inconclusive or insignificant.
Publication and survivor bias may well apply to the wider litera-
ture on the impact of development interventions. As long as these
biases are not properly addressed, systematic reviews and research
evidence-gap maps (Snilstveit, Vojtkova, Bhavsar, & Gaarder, 2013)
may only provide a partial and biased view of the real effects of
development support.Conflict of interest statement
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